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  • Brealey, Richard A., Stewart C. Myers, and Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance, Irwin McGraw-Hill – 2006.
  • Copeland, Tom, Tim Koller, and Jack Murrin, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, Wiley – 2000.
  • Damodaran, Aswath, Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice, Wiley – 2001.
  • Grinblatt, Mark, and Sheridan Titman, Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy, Wiley – 2001.
  • Stephen A. Ross, Stephen A., Randolph W. Westerfield, and Jeffrey Jaffe, Corporate Finance, Irwin McGraw-Hill – 2005.

Articles in specialised publications

  • Fazzari, Steven M., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen, 1988, “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1, pp. 141-195.

    In basic economic theory, financial and investement decisions should be made seperately. Fazzari et al. are the first to argue that, when companies have financing restrictions, investment policy becomes seriously affected. Over the last few years, a considerable number of articles have analysed the influence of financing restrictions – such as having an insufficiently developed capital market, in investment policy.

  • Harvey, Campbell, and John Graham, 2001, “The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the field,” Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-243.

    A fundamental paper to understanding how financial theory has contributed to real policies of companies. It is based on a survey of financial directors of American companies, and shows that in the majority of cases directors act in accordance with academic principles.

  • Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 305-360.

    The most quoted article in Corporate Finance. It introduces the concepts of agency costs referring to the problem suffered by companies owned by shareholders and controlled by directors. As the shareholdres and directors have different objectives, the managers tend to carry out actions which do not maximise the value of the share. Agency problems is one of the areas most analysed in Corporate Finance literature. It is also one of the first applications of game theory in Finance.

  • La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1998, “Law and Finance,”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, 1113-1155.

    These four authors, known in the academic world by their initials, LLSV, are pioneers in the field of Corporate Governance. Their work shows that there are legal conditions which determine how companies are governed. They also demonstrate that those countries with corporate governance systems which leave the investor unprotected against company management are less profitable and property is much more concentrated.

  • Mehra, Rajnish, and Edward C. Prescott. 1985. “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle.” Journal of Monetary Economics vol. 15, no. 2 (March):145–161.

    Mehra y Prescott showed that in the 90 years before 1978 investment in shares had generated an annual profitability of 6 percentage points more than State bonds. The magnitude of such a difference could not be explained reasonably with the existing theoretical models. In fact, investors should have an excessive risk aversion coefficient in order to justify this performance. A satisfactory solution to this paradox has still not been found. (Prescott received the Nobel prize in 2004).

  • Modigliani Franco, and Merton Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Jun., 1958) , pp. 261-297.

    These two economists, awarded with the Nobel prize, began their research in the field of Corporate Finance fifty years ago in order to show that under strict conditions, financing decisions are irrelevant. From here, Corporate Finance research has focused on the factors which make financing decisions relevant.

  • Myers, S., 1977, Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics 5, 147-175.

    The first important contribution which attempts to explain the theorem of irrelevance of Modigliani y Miller, using the arguments of information asymmetry. Myers theoretically shows that when shareholders have incomplete information about shares from the directors, debt is a mechanism which, by limiting their discretion, prevents directors from making inefficient decisions.

  • Shefrin, Hersh (2002) Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding behavioral finance and the psychology of investing. Oxford Universtity Press

    A good book for understanding Behavioural Finance, which contributes to explaining financial phenomena with the basic idea that investors are not rational. Behavioural Finance applies Psychology concepts and constructions such as the excess of confidence, the aversion to loss or prospect theory to markets.

  • Shleifer, Andrei (1999) Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance, Oxford University Press.

    Andrei Shleifer’s book is essential for understanding how irrational investors have an effect on markets. The principal idea is that in markets with investors who respond to unpredictable feelings, a sophisticated investor can make money by correcting the errors made by the irrational investors. However, when sophisticated investors (eg. risk funds) do not have unlimited funds, hedging does not prevent prices from reflecting the fundamental value of assets.

Interesting links